Conceptualizing Coercive Indoctrination in Moral and Legal Philosophy

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Abstract

This paper argues that there are compelling grounds for thinking that coercive indoctrination can defeat or mitigate moral culpability in virtue of being a form of non-culpable moral ignorance. That is, I defend a two-tier account such that what (at least partially) excuses an agent for a wrongful act is the agent’s ignorance regarding the moral quality of their act; and what excuses the defendant for their ignorance is that coercion or manipulation deprived the defendant of a fair opportunity to avoid that ignorance. I further argue that criminal defense theory would better track moral culpability were it to broaden existing defenses whose desert-base is moral ignorance—such as insanity or mistaken-belief self-defense—to include non-culpable ignorance due to diminished situational control. In this way, criminal law can plausibly recognize a defense of coercive indoctrination without postulating any new categories of defense. © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature.

Subject

Coercive indoctrination
Culpability
Excuse
Fair opportunity
Manipulation
Moral ignorance

Publication Title

Publication Year

2021

Publication Date

2021

Source

Scopus

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Conceptualizing Coercive Indoctrination in Moral and Legal Philosophy, dans Science & Ignorance, consulté le 21 Novembre 2024, https://ignorancestudies.inist.fr/s/science-ignorance/item/4620

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