This volume consists of a series of essays on the epistemology of fake news, written by leading philosophers. The epistemology of fake news is a branch of applied epistemology, and an exercise in non-ideal epistemology. It provides insight into the nature and spread of misinformation, fake news, conspiratorial thinking, echo chambers, epistemic pathologies in the formation of public opinion, and the relation between epistemic ideals and fake news. The volume is arranged into three parts. The chapters in Part I are concerned with the meaning of ‘fake news’ and related notions such as ‘conspiracy theory’ as well as with the novelty of the phenomenon of fake news. This part also addresses the question whether ‘fake news’ and related notions can be properly used within science. Part II discusses various practices that generate fake news, promote its spread, or are purported to do so. These practices include science denialism, Google algorithms, democratic ideals, vice in experts, and unreliable echo chambers. Part III explores potential therapies for fake news. Authors’ proposals include developing the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness, abstaining from news, and developing good epistemic practices.