It has long been thought that science is our best hope for realizing objective knowledge but that, to deliver on this promise, it must be free of the influence of any values that are not purely epistemic. As recent work in the philosophy, history, and social studies of science shows, however, things are not so simple. Values surface in numerous aspects of the scientific enterprise. This book asks where and how non-epistemic values are involved in science; it explores the roles these values play at the heart of science, in the assessment of evidence and explanations, and it examines the implications this has for ideals of objectivity. In the process, it considers a range of concrete examples drawn from fields as diverse as development economics, evolutionary biology, medicine, neurophysiology, environmental science, and the social/historical sciences, including empirical studies of scientific practice. While the contributors to this book differ on many specifics, the chapters share the general perspective that a defensible middle ground lies between the dichotomous views that often dominate debate: that values have no place in science, or that science is nothing but covert politics.